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Canada is renowned as a country that welcomes thousands of 
immigrants every year and is praised as a success in multiculturalism. 
But Canada was not always so welcome to immigrants and it has only 
been 40 years since Canada instituted a non-discriminatory, points-based 
immigration system. Though Canada was always “multicultural,” the 
demographic nature of the country took a marked change after 1900. The 
federal government invited hard-working immigrants from around the 
world to build the new country. However, the presence of so many Asian 
immigrants upset many segments of white society in British Columbia. 
This paper looks at how Canadian politicians justified an exclusionary 
immigration policy to solve the “problem” of Japanese immigration. This 
will focus primarily on the Lemieux mission, which was a Canadian 
diplomatic mission in 1907 aimed at restricting Japanese immigration to 
Canada.
Background to the Lemieux Mission
During the ﬁ rst decade of the twentieth century, Canada experienced 
the ﬁ rst major economic and demographic boom in its young history. Sir 
Wilfrid Laurier, Prime Minister from 1896-1911, famously promised that 
“the 20th century will belong to Canada” and he invited hard-working 
immigrants from Europe to help him build that dream. There was a 
hierarchy in the type of immigrant sought. As Canada was a member of 
the British Empire, white, Protestant Britons were preferred. Northern 
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Europeans (Scandinavians and Germans), East Europeans, and Ukrainians 
were actively sought as they had experience in the type of farming 
required for the vast prairies. Although most immigrants were generally 
welcome to Canada, skilled labourers, such as engineers, were particularly 
sought after. 
Canadian attitudes to Asian immigrants, however, were generally 
hostile. While cheap Chinese labour was invaluable in constructing the 
trans-continental Canadian Pacific Railway that would link the Atlantic 
with the Paciﬁ c, they were no longer welcome to Canada after this project 
was completed in 1885. Successive Liberal and Conservative governments 
both imposed restrictions on Chinese immigrants, which, before the 
Lemieux Mission, culminated in the $500 “head tax” of 1903. For Chinese 
labourers, this was equivalent to two years’ salary and eﬀ ectively barred 
their entry to Canada. Most Japanese immigrants went to Hawaii, but after 
the Russo-Japanese War, the Meiji Government encouraged emigration 
to continental North America.（1） By 1907, nearly one-quarter of British 
Columbia’s population, the Canadian province bordering the Paciﬁ c, was of 
Asian descent. 
With more and more Asians living in British Columbia, politicians 
there became more vocal in demanding a “White Man’s Province.” 
Several politicians and journalists claimed active membership in anti-
Asian groups, such as the “Asiatic Exclusion League.” At the turn of the 
20th century, the majority of B.C.’s white population was British-born or 
of British descent and they were strong pro-British imperialists. The B.C. 
provincial government routinely passed anti-Asian legislation, aimed at 
restricting their entry in the province or barring them from employment 
in certain sectors of industry. The federal government in Ottawa often 
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had to declare such legislation unconstitutional, not because it believed the 
legislation was discriminatory, but because it would upset Great Britain.（2）
Great Britain’s diplomatic rapprochement with the Meiji government 
complicated matters for British imperialists in Canada. In 1894, the British 
and Japanese governments signed the historic Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 
Commerce and Navigation [hereinafter “Anglo-Japanese Treaty”], which 
began the process of reversing the unequal treaties. The ﬁ rst article of the 
treaty stipulated that subjects of either country would “have full liberty 
to enter, travel, or reside in any part of the dominions and possessions of 
the other Contracting Party, and shall enjoy full and perfect protection 
for their persons and properties.”（3） The British colonies were invited to 
join the 1894 treaty but Canada decided not to. Japan and Great Britain 
became stronger allies after they signed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 
1902. Even though Canada did not join that the Anglo-Japanese Treaty 
until 1906, Sir Wilfrid Laurier’s government disallowed B.C.’s anti-Asian 
statutes to avoid embarrassing Great Britain and its new important ally, 
Japan.（4）
After the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and Japan’s military victory in the 
Russo-Japanese War in 1905, the Laurier government decided it was time 
to forge closer ties with Japan, the newest member of the Great Powers 
circle. The British Foreign Secretary allowed the Canadian government 
to join the existing 1894 Anglo-Japanese Treaty if it desired. However the 
Foreign Oﬃ  ce reminded Laurier that the Treaty would not change and 
that “Japanese subjects” would have “full liberty” to enter Canada.（5）
Laurier knew that “unrestricted Japanese immigration” would not be 
popular in B.C. so he met the Japanese Consul-General in Ottawa, Nosse 
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Tatsugoro. Laurier asked Nosse for a promise that Japanese immigrants 
would not be ﬂ ooding into Canada, especially B.C. Nosse assured Laurier 
in May 1905 that “the Japanese government will always adhere to their 
policy of voluntary restrictions on their people emigrating to British 
Columbia.”（6） Nosse was referring to the Meiji government’s pre-Russo-
Japanese War lukewarm position on emigration to North America 
(excluding Hawaii). But Nosse never asked the Meiji Government whether 
this was still oﬃ  cial policy.  When Canada adhered “without reserve” to 
the Anglo-Japanese Treaty in 1906, the Consul-General’s promises were 
not appended or mentioned in the oﬃ  cial documents. 
In the months following adherence to the treaty, thousands of 
Japanese arrived in Vancouver. Though some were in transit to the 
United States and some were returning from a trip to Japan, the sight of 
so many Japanese angered various sections of British Columbia society. 
In Vancouver, fears of an “Asiatic invasion” boiled over on 7 September 
1907. A mob led by the Asiatic Exclusion League destroyed Chinese and 
Japanese property in Vancouver and there were many wounded. This 
became known as the “Vancouver Riot.”（7） The Japanese Foreign Minister, 
Hayashi Tadasu, suggested avoiding “the usual diplomatic channels” 
and hoped Canadian authorities could settle the issue of damages and 
reparations “independently of the British government.”（8） Laurier wasted 
no time in sending his regrets to Consul-General Morikawa in Vancouver 
and to the Meiji Emperor.
Laurier, however, was not pleased with Consul-General Nosse. “The 
inﬂ ux of Oriental labour,” in the popular phrase of the day, clearly violated 
Nosse’s promises. Laurier made plans to send a diplomatic envoy to Tokyo 
to negotiate restrictions on Japanese immigration. The Cabinet endorsed 
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Rodolphe Lemieux as the government’s chief envoy. The French-Canadian 
Lemieux was one of Laurier’s most trusted ministers. The object of 
Lemieux’s mission was to obtain written assurances from the Japanese 
government that they would not allow more than 300 labourers and 
artisans a year to emigrate to Canada. Even though the ﬁ rst article of the 
Anglo-Japanese Treaty stated that the Japanese enjoyed “full and perfect 
protection for their persons and properties,” and that the race riot had 
been caused by Canadian and American agitators, by sending Lemieux 
on his mission, Laurier essentially shifted the blame to the Japanese. In 
Laurier’s opinion, it was the large “unassimilable” Japanese presence in 
Canada that had caused the riot, not the violent activities of the white 
nativists. 
The Lemieux Mission, November ‒ December 1907
Lemieux set sail for Yokohama on 29 October 1907. During his trans-
Pacific voyage, Lemieux prepared for his meeting with the Foreign 
Ministry by reading a conﬁ dential report on the situation in B.C. written 
for the Canadian Minister of the Interior, Frank Oliver. The report had a 
major impact on Lemieux’s thinking on racial matters in Canada, who had 
virtually no first-hand knowledge of anything Asian. Lemieux believed 
that Japanese immigration to Canada, whether large-scale or not, was 
primarily a racial issue which threatened to destabilize Canadian society. 
He noted how the Chinese, while paradoxically unwelcome as immigrants, 
were actually highly desirable workers.  Lemieux wrote: “[The] Chinese 
[were] less objectionable” and “in demand” because they did menial, dirty, 
and dangerous jobs, which he listed as “domestic servants, laundry men, 
cooks, labourers in clearing forests, market gardeners, inside workers in 
canneries and, above ground workers in collieries.”（9）
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On the other hand, objections were raised against the “unassimilable” 
Japanese because they were doing too good a job at integrating in 
Canadian society. The Japanese, Lemieux wrote in his notes, were more 
competitive, had “more energy,” and had “more independence than others.” 
He then listed the diﬀ erent sectors where Japanese were employing their 
“competitive” spirit: fisheries, lumber industries, boat building, mining 
industry, railways, sealing, domestic servants, market gardening, farming, 
land clearing, tailors, waiters, and ﬁ nally the all-encompassing “engaged in 
business.”（10） The Japanese faced more hostility from whites in B.C. than 
the Chinese or Asian Indians, even when they were employed in the same 
sectors, because the Japanese enterprising attitude represented a clear 
threat to established notions of the superiority of the white race. That 
threat is clearly demonstrated in the report: 
“There is an uneasiness in British Columbia to-day that would not be 
felt if the Asiatic immigration were conﬁ ned to Chinese and Hindoos, who 
are looked upon the whites as greatly inferior races….The Japanese do 
not conﬁ ne themselves to limited and subordinate occupations as do the 
Chinese and Hindoos. The Japanese are competing with white merchants 
for white trade; they are competing with white artisans and clerks for 
work and employment in every line of activity. I visited the town of 
Steveston [near Vancouver], where formerly over 3,000 white ﬁ shermen 
earned their living; they have been entirely supplanted by the Japanese. 
Steveston is now to all intents and purposes a Japanese town.”（11）
The Japanese work ethic and enthusiasm clearly represented the kind 
of labour Laurier needed to fulﬁ ll his promise of a strong and economically 
vibrant 20th century for Canada. However, their presence on Canadian 
soil manifested another unique, though ill-deﬁ ned, problem. According to 
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Lemieux’s notes, the large-scale presence of “Mongolians” in “an Anglo-
Saxon country” was “fraught with danger.” These “races [were] unfamiliar” 
with “democratic institutions,” and thus threatened ‒ though he never 
explained how ‒ British and Anglo-Saxon civilization. Although he noted 
that the ratio of whites to Asians in B.C. was an alarming “1 in every 4,” 
he concluded that the “reason for restriction [was] far more compelling[.] 
Orientals belong to a civilisation radically diﬀ erent than ours. Well nigh 
impossible gulf between the 2[.]” There was more language of fear: “the 
whites fear that in a very few years, under existing conditions, that ratio 
[of 1 in every 4] will be so decreased as to make British Columbia an 
Asiatic Colony.”（12）
In a primarily white British Columbia, it was easy to blame “the 
yellow race” for the province’s various problems. Labour leaders 
complained that they took jobs away from white workers and that they 
worked for lower wages ‒ though the truth was that factory owners 
exploited Asians for lower wages than whites would accept. Politicians and 
religious leaders claimed they were “unassimilable” and lived in unsanitary 
conditions ‒ though these leaders made no eﬀ ort to include them in their 
community or help improve their living conditions. Thus the solution to 
such an increasingly multicultural country ‒ the Lemieux mission ‒ was to 
shut the door to those most visibly “not like the others.” 
The Japanese in Canada might have been easy to exploit and blame, 
but Japan in 1907 was not weak. Lemieux would discover how diﬃ  cult it 
would be achieve his government’s goals.
Lemieux arrived in Yokohama on 14 November. The British 
Ambassador to Japan, Sir Claude MacDonald, lent the Lemieux team 
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valuable diplomatic help. MacDonald introduced Lemieux to Foreign 
Minister Count Hayashi Tadasu and the first official meeting was 
scheduled for 25 November. 
At this meeting, Lemieux’s insisted that the Japanese abide by the 
“Nosse promises” and limit emigration to Canada to 300 labourers and 
artisans a year. Lemieux attempted to ﬂ atter his hosts by emphasizing the 
history of goodwill and cordial relations between the two countries. On 
this matter of “goodwill,” Lemieux pointed out that the Laurier-led federal 
government had disallowed 22 of B.C.’s anti-Asian statues in the last ten 
years, including nine that speciﬁ cally restricted Japanese immigration. But 
Lemieux’s statement did not reveal the whole truth. The real pressure 
to disallow B.C.’s legislation came from the Japanese government, via the 
British authorities in London, rather than the federal government’s own 
sense of outrage over the discriminatory legislation.（13） Furthermore, 
Lemieux was pleased to announce that his government had approved 
a compensation package worth $9175 to the Japanese community and 
$1600 for the Japanese Consulate’s legal costs. Lemieux’s intention was to 
demonstrate that the Canadian government could and did differentiate 
racially between the Japanese and the Chinese (if only for diplomacy’s 
sake), even if British Columbians only saw “Orientals,” “Asiatics,” and 
“Mongolian hordes.” 
Hayashi and his Vice-Minister the Baron Chinda dismissed the 
Canadian Minister’s case. First, according to Chinda, Consul-General Nosse 
was “not authorized to give such assurance” in promising restrictions on 
emigration. This had been Lemieux’s strongest argument and Chinda’s 
remark suddenly undermined the diplomatic and legal grounds of 
Lemieux’s case. Second, Hayashi promised to study Lemieux’s proposals 
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but he warned the Canadian that the Japanese people “were high spirited 
and sensitive” and they would not look favourably towards a treaty which 
limited their freedom to emigrate, and “that they could not tolerate being 
regarded as inferior to other races against whom no other restrictions 
were enforced.”（14） In this respect, Hayashi taught his Canadian and 
British guests a history lesson. When the American Commodore Matthew 
Perry sailed in Edo Bay in 1853, he told the Japanese that “the only way” 
they would elevate themselves among the world’s nations would be by 
“welcoming all races to their shores.” Fifty years later, Japan’s ports 
were open to Americans and other Westerners while Asian “races” had 
the immigration “door shut in their faces” in Western countries.（15） This 
example of American (and by extension Canadian) hypocrisy was not lost 
on Lemieux. He came to appreciate the tensions his government’s eﬀ orts 
to treat Japanese immigrants as third-class (after the British and other 
white Europeans) were having in Japan.
Count Hayashi returned a week later to announce that while the 
Japanese government could not enter into a new treaty, it “acknowledged 
our diﬃ  culties in [Canada]” and was thus prepared to limit emigration.（16） 
In truth, bearing in mind its special relationship with Britain and the 
situation in British Columbia, the Japanese had very few available options. 
Even though the Japanese government stood on the legal high ground, 
it could not possibly ask for the status quo vis-à-vis Canada. To do so 
would invite more physical harm and discriminatory legislation against 
Japanese residing, or desiring to reside, in Canada. For the Japanese to go 
against the Canadian government’s express wishes might alienate Great 
Britain, their powerful ally. Yet to accept Canadian demands would be to 
acknowledge that, despite their newfound Great Power status and alliance 
with Great Britain, they were considered an “inferior race” and lumped 
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in the same category of unwanted people as the Chinese and the Indians. 
Hayashi accepted the Canadian demands because while the restrictions 
were insulting and their treaty rights violated, there were other places 
where Japanese labour could emigrate and make a valuable contribution, 
such as Korea, Manchuria, and South America.（17）
Rodolphe Lemieux, Claude MacDonald, Joseph Pope (the Canadian 
undersecretary of State for External Affairs), and Ishii Kikujiro (then 
Director of the Bureau of Commerce of the Foreign Ministry) drafted a 
proposal on December 4 that would become the basis for the Lemieux 
Agreement. The wording of the proposal conveyed a stronger sense of 
racial exclusion than even Lemieux had originally suggested. Whereas 
Lemieux had demanded a limit of 300 labourers and artisans per year, 
according to the proposed draft, all Japanese emigration would be 
forbidden. Only four exemptions were made: 1) current Japanese residents 
of Canada; 2) domestics for Japanese residents; 3) contract labourers 
requested by Japanese residing in Canada or by Canadian nationals, who 
then needed the Canadian government’s approval; and 4) agricultural 
workers or miners for Japanese-owned farms and mines.（18） Rather than 
change the wording of the 1894 treaty, the Japanese government would 
send a letter detailing these instructions to the British Ambassador and 
the local Consular authorities. These four exceptions had a dual purpose. 
Those few permitted to emigrate would be working on the margins of 
the Canadian economy. Furthermore, the restrictions indicated a desire 
to segregate Japanese workers and their community from the white 
community.
Lemieux returned to Ottawa in January 1908 and the Cabinet 
approved Lemieux’s arrangement. This became known as the “Lemieux 
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Agreement.” From May 1908, Japanese immigration ground to a halt 
and less than 50 left for Canada over the next six months. The Lemieux 
Mission, in B.C.’s white community’s opinion, had clearly been a success.
Conclusion
With a population consisting of French, English, and Aboriginal 
peoples, Canada had been “multi-cultural” before 1900. However, 
Aboriginals lived on reserves and, except for some communities in Quebec, 
Ontario, and New Brunswick, there was little daily interaction between 
French and English. When the transcontinental railway opened Western 
Canada to large-scale settlement, immigrants from various countries 
and cultures now lived closely together in the same communities. In the 
majority of these communities, whites and those of British descent claimed 
the moral and political higher ground.
How did British Columbia, the ﬁ rst Canadian province to experience 
multiculturalism with people from Asia, deal with this situation? As the 
province was on the front lines of Asian immigration, political and labour 
leaders’ actions entailed the construction of a white Anglo-Saxon country, 
rather than the construction of an economically strong country which 
could develop its vast natural resources and compete with the United 
States. Despite Canada’s multi-ethnic community, it was easy to claim 
superiority for political gain in the era of Social Darwinism and “Yellow 
Peril.” This was particularly true in British Columbia, which was on the 
front lines of Asian immigration. The white Anglo-Saxon leaders of B.C. 
used the baseless rhetoric of fear (“hordes of Orientals” who drove down 
wages) to rally their fellow Canadians to the cause of Asian exclusion 
and discriminatory immigration legislation. While the Lemieux mission 
targeted only Japanese migrants, it was one part of a larger effort by 
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provincial and federal governments to bar Asian peoples from settling on 
Canada’s shores. 
The solution was not to help the Japanese or other Asian immigrants 
integrate in Canadian society. The solution was to prevent them from 
immigrating to Canada. Even though the Japanese held rights enshrined 
in a British treaty that permitted them “full liberty” to travel and reside 
in Canada, the Japanese government could not force the Canadian 
government to obey the treaty. The strong anti-Asian feeling in Canada 
and the desire to keep Great Britain as an ally forced the Japanese 
government to allow restrictions on emigration. The Lemieux Agreement 
was initially enforced to keep Canada, particularly British Columbia, 
“white” and to quell labour’s fear of “unfair competition.” Discriminatory 
immigration measures against the Chinese endured until the end of the 
Second World War, and until 1968 for Japanese immigrants, because there 
was no political will in Canada, nor elsewhere in the white Western world, 
to end the measures. 
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